

# **KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI EMERGENCY OPERATIONS PLAN**

**Annex N: Terrorism**

**September 2014**

## KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI TERRORISM PLAN

Primary (lead) Departments:	City Manager - Emergency Management Health Department Fire Department Police Department
Secondary (support) Departments:	Aviation Department EMS Medical Director General Services - City Security Information Technology Department Water Services Department Other City Departments as Required
Secondary (support) External Agencies:	Department of Homeland Security Federal Bureau of Investigation Mutual Aid Terrorism Early Warning Group

### **I. PURPOSE STATEMENT**

The purpose of this annex is 1) to establish a unified approach for emergency response departments of the City of Kansas City, Missouri, to respond to and recover from a threat or act of terrorism, and 2) to establish a terrorism response system that prescribes responsibilities and actions required to respond to and recover from a terrorist event.

### **II. SITUATION AND PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS**

#### A. Situation

1. The City of Kansas City has assets that could be targets for terrorist activities. These include, but are not limited to:
  - a. Federal, state, county and municipal government facilities and structures
  - b. Chemical facilities
  - c. Medical facilities

- d. Religious facilities
  - e. Businesses and manufacturing centers
  - f. Airports, railroads, highways and navigable rivers
  - g. Pipelines; power plants; public utilities; landmarks; and large public gatherings
  - h. Agriculture
2. Terrorism takes many forms: bombings, arson, infrastructure attacks (on water, electric, gas, or telecommunications systems), mass shootings, cyberspace failure or disruption, transportation attacks (hijacking, bombing, sabotage etc.), and other acts of violence or intimidation in pursuit of political aims.
- a. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): Any weapon designed or intended to cause death or serious bodily injury through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous chemicals, or their precursors; any weapon involving a disease organism; or any weapon designed to release radiation or radioactivity at a level dangerous to human life (18 USC 2332a).
  - b. Chemical Agent: A chemical substance intended to kill, seriously injure, or incapacitate people through physiological effects. Hazardous chemicals, including industrial chemicals and agents, can be introduced via aerosol devices (including munitions, sprayers, or aerosol generators), breaking containers, or covert dissemination. A chemical agent attack might release a chemical warfare agent (such as a nerve or blister agent) or an industrial chemical that may have serious consequences. Whether an infectious agent or a hazardous chemical causes an outbreak may not be obvious early in an investigation; however, most chemical attacks are localized, and their effects become evident within a few minutes. Different chemical agents can be persistent or non-persistent. Persistent agents remain in the affected area for hours, days, or weeks. Non-persistent agents may have high evaporation rates, be lighter than air, or disperse rapidly; therefore the ability to cause casualties is significantly reduced over a relatively short period of time (although they may persist longer in small unventilated areas).
  - c. Biological Agents: Living organisms or materials derived from them that cause disease; harm humans, animals, or plants; or deteriorate materials. Recognition of a biological hazard can occur by: identifying it as a credible threat; discovering bio-terrorism evidence (devices, agents, clandestine labs); diagnosing a disease caused by an agent identified as a possible bio-terrorism agent; or gathering and interpreting public health surveillance data. People exposed to a

pathogen such as anthrax or smallpox may not know they have been exposed, and those infected or subsequently infected may not feel sick for some time. Infectious diseases typically progress with a delay between exposure and onset of illness –the incubation period. The incubation period may range from several hours to a few weeks, depending on the exposure and pathogen. Unlike acute incidents involving explosives or some hazardous chemicals, direct patient care providers and the public health community are likely to first detect a biological attack on civilians (See annex M and/or the LPHA ERP). Terrorists also could use biological agents to affect agricultural commodities (agro-terrorism). These agents include wheat rust or viruses that could devastate the local or even national economy.

- d. Radiological/Nuclear: High-energy particles or gamma rays emitted by an atom undergoing radioactive decay. Emitted particles can be charged alpha or beta particles, or neutral neutrons, or gamma rays. The difficulty of responding to a nuclear or radiological incident is compounded by the nature of radiation itself. Also, involvement of radioactive materials in an explosion may or may not be obvious; depending on what explosive device was used. The presence of a radiation hazard is difficult to ascertain unless the responders have the proper detection equipment and the training to use it. Most of the many detection devices available are designed to detect specific types and levels of radiation -they are not appropriate for measuring or ruling out the presence of all possible radiological hazards. Terrorists may use the following delivery methods:
  - 1) An improvised nuclear device (IED) is any explosive device designed to cause a nuclear yield. Either uranium or plutonium isotopes can fuel these devices, depending on the trigger. While “weapons-grade” material increases the efficiency a device, materials of less than weapons grade can still be used.
  - 2) A radiological dispersal device (RDD) is any explosive device that spreads radioactive material when detonated. A RDD includes an improvised explosive device that could be used by placing it in close proximity to radioactive material. A RDD also includes devices identified as “dirty bombs”.
  - 3) A simple RDD spreads radiological material non-explosively (for example, medical isotopes or waste).
- e. Explosives: Conventional explosive devices or improvised bombs used to cause massive local destruction or to disperse chemical, biological, or radiological agents. Improvised explosive devices are categorized as explosive or incendiary -using high or low filler explosive materials to explode and/or cause fires. Bombs and firebombs are inexpensive and easily constructed. They are not technologically sophisticated. Of all weapons, these are the easiest to obtain and use. The components are readily available, as are detailed instructions for constructing these devices. They are the likeliest

terrorist weapons.

- f. Cyber Terrorism: “The use of computer network tools to shut down critical national infrastructures through the use of high technology to bring about political, religious, or ideological aims, actions that result in disabling or deleting critical infrastructure data or information.” (The Center for Strategic and International Studies)

#### B. Assumption

1. This Annex supplements **Annex E – Law Enforcement**, and relates strictly to terrorist incidents involving chemical, biological, radioactive, nuclear, explosive materials (CBRNE), and cyber-terrorism.
2. The KCPD is responsible for law enforcement operations within the city, including those related to terrorism. Federal law enforcement authorities will have extensive involvement in any local terrorism incident. The KCPD will be the single point of coordination with federal law enforcement authorities during such incidents.
3. All terrorist incidents and all suspected terrorist incidents are considered a crime scene. The KCPD will take appropriate actions to preserve evidence.
4. The KCHD is responsible for health operations within the city, including those related to terrorism.
5. Terrorist incidents may not be detected initially, due to the characteristics of the agent employed. For example, biological incidents may appear natural at first, but later determined to be manmade due to the strain, the rate of spread, the area of contamination, or other characteristics. This Annex will apply whether the incident is identified immediately or after a delay.
6. The resources and/or expertise of local agencies could quickly be depleted by a response to a major terrorist incident and its consequences. Extensive use of regional, state, and federal resources are expected. All levels of government will therefore participate in a NIMS/ICS unified command structure, and the Emergency Operations Center will be activated to support the incident.
7. For terrorist events involving weapons of mass destruction, there may be a large number of casualties. Injured or ill victims will require specialized medical treatment, potentially including decontamination and medical facilities and may require establishing temporary medical operations in the field. Fatally injured victims may be numerous and their bodies contaminated or infectious. Special mortuary arrangements are likely to be necessary.
8. Terrorist incidents may involve damage or disruption to computer systems, telecommunications networks, or Internet systems; disturbance to vital community networks for utilities, transportation, or communication; and/or could endanger the health and safety of the population at risk,

interrupt emergency response operations, and result in substantial economic losses.

9. The City of Kansas City recognizes the responsibility for public health and safety, the need of a plan to set forth guidelines to deal with terrorism, and the need to exercise the procedures, policies, and guidelines set forth in this Annex
10. No single agency at the City, State, or Federal level possesses the authority and/or the expertise to act unilaterally on the many difficult issues that may arise in response to a threat or act of terrorism, particularly if WMD is involved.
11. Should a terrorist incident be identified, the City of Kansas City could be acting alone pending mobilization and deployment of other local, State and Federal assets.
12. An act of terrorism involving WMD in the Kansas City Missouri Metropolitan area could immediately overwhelm the city response capabilities.
13. Counter terrorism efforts including intelligence gathering and appropriate response training may reduce some incident potential, but incidents can occur with little or no warning.
14. If appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) is not readily available, entry into the contaminated area (hot zone) may be delayed until the arrival of trained and equipped emergency response personnel. Responders must also be aware of secondary devices targeting first responders.

### **III. LEGAL AUTHORITIES**

The City will act in good faith under this Plan and comply with all local, state, and federal laws, statutes, ordinances, and regulations.

### **IV. ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES**

A response organization for a terrorism incident will be under the Direction and Control of the city manager. The coordinated response will be conducted from the EOC. The primary responders for terrorism are normally local law enforcement, fire, health, and medical personnel. All other departments are considered to be support. Each jurisdiction should prepare an SOG and functional check list for response to a terrorism incident as defined in the Basic Plan (P&S Chart). All participating departments must comply with training requirements set-forth by SEMA. In addition, an up-to-date list of emergency response personnel will be maintained and available. The following provides a breakdown by functional areas:

## A. Departmental Responsibilities

### 1. EOC Function

- a. The Federal Government is responsible to determine the Nations threat level. See Attachment N-2 HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY SYSTEM. However, it is up to the local jurisdiction to determine their appropriate threat level based upon their current situation.
- b. If notification of a terrorist incident is received, the Emergency Management Director will immediately contact the city manager and primary and support agencies as identified in the Primary & Support Responsibility Charts.
- c. If notification of an incident is received by other than the Office of Emergency Management, the individual receiving the notification will contact the Office of Emergency Management and/or the city manager immediately.
- d. The Office of Emergency Management is responsible to contact SEMA Staff Duty Officer and advise of the current local situation and threat. Other local departments will follow their respective SOG's for notifications.
- e. Activate the EOC at either the primary or alternate location. The EOC serves as the clearinghouse for the local jurisdiction to collect, discuss, and disseminate information in regard to a particular event occurring within their jurisdiction. The EOC is responsible to maintain contact with appropriate State and Federal Agencies throughout the incident period.
- f. Review LEOP and determine if pre-designated staging areas, mobilizations and reception centers are far enough away from the actual scene so that safety is guaranteed.
- g. If necessary, a Joint Operation Center (JOC) will be established by the Lead Federal Agency (LFA) and will be under the operational control of the Federal on Scene Commander (OSC). The JOC is the focal point and is responsible for coordinating requests from the State. The Incident Commander may request that a representative from the impacted jurisdiction be assigned to the JOC.

### 2. Emergency Management

- a. Direction and Control will originate from the local EOC.
- b. Ensure the alternate EOCs are ready in the event that the primary EOC is not available
- c. The EOC will be staffed in accordance with the Base Plan.
- d. Coordinate with SEMA's EOC and other federal, state or local agencies as necessary.

- e. Prepare and distribute Situations Reports (SitReps).
  - f. Coordinate response and recovery operations.
  - g. Identify and coordinate resource requirements.
3. Aviation Department
- Responsible for the operation and protection of the Kansas City International and Downtown Airports in conjunction with the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and other federal authorities.
4. Emergency Management
- The primary department responsible for planning and coordination related to homeland security operations<sup>1</sup>.
5. EMS Medical Director
- The EMS Medical Director is the primary source of day-to-day medical direction and clinical oversight of all aspects of the pre-hospital emergency medical services system.
6. Fire Department
- The KCFD is responsible for Hazmat operations, rescue and gross decontamination operations related to CBRNE incidents.
- a. Respond to all reports of terrorist incidents to determine the nature and scope of the incident.
  - b. Provide a representative to the EOC and coordinate with City of Kansas City law enforcement and other agencies for support and resource requirements.
  - c. Establish site security areas and hazard exclusion zones in accordance with established procedures and guidelines.
  - d. Determine the nature of the incident.
  - e. Provide information on hazardous material/evaluation and environmental damage assessment.
  - f. Develop and maintain internal guidelines to identify specific roles and responsibilities of fire service personnel in each of the major terrorism incidents involving CBRNE.
  - g. The Chief of Emergency Medical Service (EMS) is primarily responsible for directing the medical response and on scene operation within the impacted area, and is responsible for emergency medical services (ALS),

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<sup>1</sup> Excluding those responsibilities under the KCPD, such as criminal investigations and other law enforcement responsibilities.



as well as the transportation of the sick and injured to local hospital emergency rooms. The EMS is responsible for identifying and anticipating resource requirements and allocates resources accordingly. EMS coordinates mutual aid in conjunction with the County Health Officer.

h. Maintain continual communication with the local EOC.

7. General Services Department – Security

GSD's Citywide Security is responsible for safety and security operations at all City facilities, with the exception of Aviation and Water Services Department facilities.

8. Health Department

The KCHD is responsible for public health operations related to CBRNE incidents, and for the dissemination of mass prophylaxis medications in response to disease and contamination related to terrorist incidents.

Health Department and Office of Environmental Management

- a. Provide personnel safety information to the EOC.
- b. Provide an environmental analysis, with help from the MO Dept. of Health and Senior Services and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Coordinate with County Health Director on all health issues. The County Health Director is responsible to determine the health risk, and recommend epidemiological and toxicological solutions to deal with public health issues involved in a terrorist incident.
- c. Monitor response personnel and general public exposure to chemical, biological, and radiological agents.
- d. Monitor and track potential victims.
- e. Provide information regarding exposure and treatment to potential victims and workers.
- f. The County Health and Medical Director or a designated representative will assist the PIO on Health and Medical issues and in concerning public and individual health issues.
- g. Maintain continual communication with the local EOC.

9. Information Technology Department

The ITD is responsible for the operation and protection of City computer, telephone and other IT systems.

10. Police Department

The KCPD is responsible for law enforcement operations related to terrorist incidents in cooperation with the DHS, FBI and other state and federal law enforcement agencies.

Local Law Enforcement:

- a. Manage the incident scene. Set-up Incident Management System (IMS) to manage/coordinate with other departments and agencies using the Unified Command System.
- b. Respond to requests for support/assistance from other departments; local, state, and federal.
- c. Provide security, maintain order, prevent unauthorized entry, control and re-route traffic and maintain open access/egress for authorized vehicles into the terrorist incident scene.
- d. Assist in evacuation/in place protection notification of the affected area as requested by the EOC or the on scene incident commander.
- e. Develop and maintain Standard Operating Guides (SOGs) of duties, roles and responsibilities for any terrorism incidents involving Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives (CBRNE).
- f. Ensure Scene Security and evidence preservation pending arrival of the FBI, and assist the FBI and other investigative authorities in determining responsibility.
- g. Establish access control into and out of crime scene.
- h. Provide security for Command Post and EOC.
- i. Manage crowd control when necessary.

11. Water Services Department

The WSD is responsible for the operation and protection of the City's water and sewer systems in conjunction with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and other state and federal agencies.

12. Public Works

- a. Respond to emergency requests from the EOC by providing resources, i.e. trucks, earth moving equipment and other needed assets/materials along with operators to reduce hazards, minimizing secondary damage.
- b. Provide barricades to assist in evacuation and/or scene security.
- c. Assist in providing temporary storage of equipment and materials until appropriate locations can be located.

- d. Coordinate with the EOC and the on scene commander to insure the area is safe to enter. Do not enter any area if it has not cleared and declared safe for reentry.

## **V. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS**

### **A. Operational Time Frames**

#### **1. Mitigation**

- a. Develop a method for processing information.
- b. Analyze potential threats, targets, and potential hazards for the jurisdiction. Disseminate on a need to know basis when appropriate.
- c. Identify facilities, agencies, personnel, and resources necessary to support a terrorist incident response.
- d. Whenever possible, training exercises conducted by local jurisdictions should include terrorism (WMD) and the use of the High Spatial Resolution Remote Sensing (HSRRS) equipment. The purpose is to provide a training opportunity, and to exercise HSRRS capabilities as required by the Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP).
- e. Review and become familiar with the SEOP.

#### **2. Preparedness: City of Kansas City, Missouri will take the appropriate security measures. See Attachment N-3 for Federal and State Homeland Security Advisory System threat guidelines.**

- a. Develop and review Plans and SOG's for response to a terrorist incident. Open and prepare the EOC for possible full activation.
- b. Advise key personnel of the potential risk.
- c. Make recommendation as to a possible course of action.
- d. Maintain increased readiness status until the situation escalates or the decision to discontinue operations is given. Train personnel and maintain inventory of equipment and supplies.

#### **3. Response**

- a. Any individual who receives notification of a terrorist incident or who is responsible for making notifications must assure that every effort is made to contact primary and support personnel as identified in the Basic Plan and to immediately notify SEMA.
- b. Once a terrorism incident is suspected, city law enforcement will report and request assistance from the state using existing operating guidelines

and/or procedures.

- c. Each Emergency Response agency shall send a representative to the EOC and may be required to provide a representative to the on-scene Unified Command.
- d. City government departments will provide assistance to the EOC as dictated by the current situation.
- e. A designated City Public Information Officer (PIO) will coordinate all public information releases. (See Annex C)

#### 4. Recovery

- a. Determine the extent of damages, prepare a damage assessment report and request assistance.
- b. Test, check, and exercise equipment to identify its serviceability.
- c. Restore essential public services to critical facilities.
- d. Inventory and replace supplies as necessary.
- e. Restore all public service to the general population.

Note: Team leaders/Team technicians will contact local jurisdictions to determine specific recovery action items that are specific the jurisdiction.

#### B. Initiation of Operations

The Office of Emergency Management will initiate operations in accordance with the following criteria:

##### 1. Routine/Minimal Threat

- a. A general threat is received that lacks the authority, specificity or credibility to warrant any heightened alert or protective actions.
- b. No action will be taken beyond normal day-to-day operations.

##### 2. Potential Threat

- a. Information is received from an authoritative source (such as the KCPD or DHS) which indicates a potential threat to a specific sector (such as transportation, water) exists, but the credibility cannot be assessed, or there is no direct connection to the City of Kansas City.
- b. OEM will disseminate such information to appropriate departments as necessary for them to evaluate whether any heightened alert or protective actions are required.

##### 3. Credible Threat


Information is received from an authoritative source (such as the KCPD or DHS) that a specific and credible threat has been made to a sector or

location within the City of Kansas City or the Kansas City region. OEM will activate the EOC at Level I or Level II, depending on the nature and credibility of the threat. OEM will activate the Homeland Security Committee (see Figure 18) to begin:

- a. Assessing the threat scenario to determine the extent of contingency planning needed.
  - b. Reviewing response protocols and placing necessary personnel and resources on an appropriate “standby” level.
  - c. Intensifying reporting by departmental security personnel of any unusual or suspicious activity.
  - d. Development and implementation of heightened protective measures.
  - e. Dissemination of public alerts, as appropriate.
4. Suspected or Confirmed Terrorist Incident

Reports from an official source are received indicating:

- a. A terrorist incident has occurred involving mass casualties or the use or threatened use of a CBRNE.
- b. Under conditions of a prior credible threat:
  - 1) A mass casualty incident of unknown or suspicious origin has occurred
  - 2) First responders report finding victims displaying signs and/or symptoms of a biological, nuclear, or chemical event with an unknown or suspicious origin
  - 3) Any sudden or repeated occurrence of an illness or disease not typically seen in this region, or exhibiting a rate of spread which suggests a suspicion origin
  - 4) Any major incident or series of incidents that indicate coordinated and purposeful cyber intrusions or cyber attack on public utilities or other essential infrastructure
- c. OEM will activate the EOC at Level II or Level III, depending on the nature of the incident, and will begin coordinated emergency response operations.

**Fig. 18**

**B. Primary Objectives in Response to a Terrorist Incident (see also Attachment N-1 RECOMMENDED CBRNE INCIDENT OPERATING PROCEDURES)**

1. Protect the lives and safety of the citizens and first responders.
2. Identification of the involvement and nature of a CBRNE agent/device, and implementation of appropriate protective measures.
3. Isolation, containment, or other actions to limit the spread of the CBRNE agent/device.
4. Identify the type of agent or devices used.
5. Identify and establish control zones for suspected agent used.
6. Identify appropriate decontamination procedure and/or treatment.
7. Preservation of evidence.
8. Notification of appropriate authorities.
9. Provision of timely and accurate public information.
10. Protect critical infrastructure.

**C. Emergency Operations**

1. Emergency operations will be implemented in accordance with the following:

- a. Law Enforcement

**Annex E – Law Enforcement Operations**

- b. Fire, Rescue and Hazmat

**Annex F – Fire, Rescue, Hazmat Operations**

c. Infrastructure Operations

**Annex I – Infrastructure Operations**

d. Evacuation Operations

**Annex J – Evacuation and Transportation Services**

e. Mass Care and Special Needs

**Annex L – Mass Care and Special Needs Operations**

f. Health and Medical

**Annex M – Health and Medical Operations**

2. In the absence of superseding procedures and policies, response to CBRNE incidents may be handled in accordance with **Attachment N-1 – Recommended CBRNE Incident Operating Procedures**.

## ATTACHMENT N-1

### **RECOMMENDED CBRNE INCIDENT OPERATING PROCEDURES**

The responding agency's operational SOPs take precedence in all circumstances. The following guidelines are used when the standing applicable SOPs do not cover a specific situation. The following guidelines were excerpted from the Florida Division of Emergency Management Local Terrorism Plan.

#### A. Initial First Response Actions

The primary objective is always first responder safety. First responders who are not trained to the required level for operations in possibly contaminated or otherwise hostile areas are best used to demarcate the affected area and effect an evacuation of the surrounding area.

#### B. Arrival on Scene

The initial actions that are taken by the first responders will set the stage for the rest of the operation. The first responders should:

1. Respond to all incidents using appropriate protective equipment.
2. Gather as much information from dispatch as possible regarding the incident.
3. Determine wind direction and speed at incident location. This information should be available from police and fire dispatchers. Approach the incident scene from upwind (with the wind behind you) and uphill, when possible.
4. Survey the scene from a safe distance before making approach.
5. Park responding apparatus a safe distance away. Do not drive apparatus into the suspected area, as crews may become casualties. Do not block access.
6. Stage additional responding units a safe distance away from the scene. Anticipate and position the apparatus at an advantageous position for both an easy deployment and a quick tactical retreat.
7. Initiate Incident Command.
8. Assess on-scene indicators and request additional resources if needed. Keep in mind that a common mistake made by first responders is to expect the usual and not the unusual. If in doubt, err on the side of safety and request additional resources as they can easily be cancelled later. In the case of suspected multiple casualties, always consider activating a mass casualty call as early as prudently possible.
9. Initiate accountability system.
10. Commence operations.

#### C. Threat Assessment

Do a visual assessment of the scene and report this information back to dispatch. The location of the incident may be an indicator as to whether or not this may have been a terrorist event. Indicators may include:

1. Occupancy or location



2. Symbolic or historical
3. Public buildings or assembly areas
4. Controversial businesses
5. Infrastructure systems
6. Type of event
7. An intentional act or unusual circumstances.
8. Explosives and/or incendiaries
9. Trends or previous terrorist events
10. Incidents involving firearms
11. Non-trauma mass casualty incidents
12. Timing of the event
13. Events that occur on the anniversary date of another significant event (for example, Waco, Oklahoma City)
14. On-scene warnings
15. On-scene observations could indicate something out of the ordinary (that is, unusual equipment or supplies on site, secondary devices)
16. Unexplained illnesses or deaths
17. Items that seem out of place, such as containers, spray devices, and items that have been moved from their normal location.
18. Prior incident history for location

D. Scene Control

Emergency responders should perform a sweep of the area to locate/assist possible disoriented victims and secondary or multiple devices. Victims that are able to walk may wander away from the initial scene.

E. Establish and Secure Communications

It is important to identify the channel or frequency on which the responders will need to monitor and transmit. In the case of multi-agency responses it will be paramount to establish a location where personnel with a variety of equipment can be staged to assist with the communication between agencies.

F. Identify the "Hazard Control Zone"

With every terrorist incident there will be an area that may be hazardous to any personnel or civilians within the area. When possible, first responders should determine where the most hazardous location is and initiate control zone procedures.

G. Establish an Inner Incident Perimeter

An inner perimeter must be established so emergency personnel have a safe and controlled area to work in and assemble. The establishment and demarcation of the inner perimeter will automatically designate the inside boundary of the "Outside Incident Perimeter." The inner perimeter will include

additional operational and/or functional perimeters to be determined by first responding personnel. These additional perimeters will include hot, warm, and cold zones and small staging or operational areas, such as decontamination corridors and triage and transport areas.

H. Establish and Adjust the Outer Incident Perimeter (As Needed)

The establishment of the outer incident perimeter will be a by-product of the establishment of the "Inner Incident Perimeter" as the inside demarcation line of the outer perimeter is also the outside demarcation line of the inner perimeter. The outside demarcation line of the outer perimeter will be established under the advice of the appropriate command officer. The intent of the outer perimeter is to secure a buffer area between the working units and the general community.

Outside perimeter control will be maintained by local law enforcement forces and should be setup as early as possible. Clearly marked and designated entry and exit points must be identified and communicated to Command, Dispatch, and all responding units. Once the perimeters are established, the evacuation of all non-emergency and unauthorized personnel inside the designated perimeters must be accomplished.

I. Establish the Incident Command Post

An Incident Command Post should be established between the inner perimeter and the outer perimeter to provide on-site coordination of services. The Incident Command Post should be located uphill and upwind of the incident, if possible. The area should be swept for secondary devices prior to the command post being set up. Once the Incident Command Post area has been swept for secondary devices, the law enforcement sector will make provisions for providing command post security to guard against the placement of a secondary device and intrusions in general.

Area traffic should be monitored and controlled to protect against the placement of large secondary explosive devices, such as car bombs.

J. Designate a Staging Area

Designate an area where resources and equipment can be delivered, stockpiled, and utilized should be established. The staging area should be selected far enough away from the actual scene so that safety is guaranteed. However, it also must be close enough for instantaneous deployment of staged resources.

This area should also be swept for secondary devices prior to becoming operational. Law enforcement will set up perimeter security and maintain security until the conclusion of the incident. Security should be designed against the placement of secondary devices and intrusions.

K. Identify and Request Additional Resources

As soon as possible, the first responders should assess the situation and determine what type of additional support is, or may be, needed. Once the specialized teams arrive, the response actions may include:

1. Identification of agent
2. Identification of any possible secondary devices
3. Protective measure to reduce and/or eliminate the threat

4. Preservation of crime scene
5. Identification and removal of casualties/fatalities
6. Decontamination of casualties/fatalities
7. Triage of casualties

L. Identify CBRNE Device/Agent

Unknown Substance Testing and Identification - During an incident there might be a need to test an unknown substance to determine whether or not it is a hazardous material or a WMD agent. Most first responding Hazmat teams are able to conduct preliminary testing to determine, to a certain degree, the makeup of the substance. More definite testing will need to be conducted to positively identify the substance in question.

1. Biological - On-scene Hazmat teams may conduct or assist in evaluation of a preliminary sample collection for the presence of biological agents. Any test with a positive indication of a hazardous material may automatically escalate the response. Law enforcement will usually take possession of the properly bagged substance and start the procedure for transporting the substance so that more definitive testing can be conducted.
2. Nuclear - On-scene Hazmat teams will survey for the presence of radioactive types of materials and should be able to provide a quantitative assessment on the exposure levels emanating from alpha, beta, and gamma sources present on the scene.
3. Chemical - On-scene Hazmat teams will conduct preliminary field-testing for the presence, classification, and concentration of hazardous chemicals. Additional assistance in chemical identification and course of action is available at CHEMTREC's 24-hour "Hot Line" at 1-800-424-9300. If the substance in question is military in nature, contact U.S. Army Operations Center at [REDACTED] (for explosive materials) or Defense Logistics Agency at 1-800-851-8061 (dangerous materials other than explosives).

M. Identification of Possible Secondary Devices

Recent events with incendiary devices have highlighted the need for extreme caution on the part of responders. Secondary devices aimed at first responders have been found and have detonated at the initial scene. Bomb squad and/or other qualified personnel should perform this assessment.

The law enforcement sector officer, upon the advice of the on-scene bomb squad, must determine whether or not cellular phones, radios, beepers, and car alarm remotes must be turned off or kept away from suspected bombs. The radio frequency transmitted by one of these devices may cause a device to detonate.

Once the command post area has been swept for secondary devices, law enforcement will make provisions for providing command post security to guard against the placement of a secondary device and intrusions in general.

N. Remove Casualties/Fatalities

The extrication of victims will be done in accordance to standard triage practices. Obvious fatalities will be left in place pending the activation and arrival of the

Medical Examiner's Team and/or Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team (D-MORT).

O. Decontaminate Casualties

The standard Hazardous Material decontamination procedure will be followed. If it is determined that an alternate decontamination method is needed due to a particular contaminant, the on-scene Medical Officer in Charge, Poison Control, CHEMTREC, local Hazardous Material Team, and/or the military will be consulted. All decontamination actions conducted by first responders will be carried out using the appropriate personal protection equipment (PPE) as determined by the senior Hazardous Materials Officer on-scene or by the appropriate standard operating procedures (SOPs).

In the event of gas or vapor contamination, the simple removal of the outer layer of clothing on the victim may be sufficient decontamination. If further, or more thorough, decontamination is necessary, it will be performed in the following three stages:

1. Gross decontamination, involves the safe removal of the victim from the contaminated environment, complete removal of the victims' clothes, and a complete head to toe rinse with the appropriate solution (usually plain water or a combination of water and 0.5% household bleach.)
2. Secondary decontamination involves more thorough washing of the victim in a head to toe fashion using a decontamination solution, which is then followed by a complete rinsing.
3. Definitive decontamination is carried out by a series of washes and rinses until such time that it is certain that all contaminants have been removed from the victim. Definitive decontamination will usually take place at a medical facility.

O. Triage of Casualties

Triage will be performed in accordance with the Simple Triage and Rapid Treatment (S.T.A.R.T) method. S.T.A.R.T. is a tag system designed to assess a large number of victims rapidly and can be used by all personnel regardless of their medical training. The initial triage is accomplished by the assessment of respiratory rate, perfusion, and mental status. Triage ribbons/tags are used to identify the priority of the patients:

**BLACK = DECEASED**

**RED = IMMEDIATE**

**YELLOW = DELAYED**

**GREEN = MINOR**

Secondary triage is performed on all patients during the treatment phase in the medical sector. During this phase patients can be up-graded or down-graded depending upon the dynamics of their injuries.

P. Isolation and Quarantining of the Injured and Exposed

Decisions regarding long-term quarantining of the community for highly contagious biological agents will be made by the City Health Director, State Health Department, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).

R. Transport of Victims

Victims should be decontaminated at the scene prior to transportation. Transportation of decontaminated patients to the appropriate facilities will follow the standard protocols for a mass casualty incident. In-place, on-scene, temporary sheltering of victims may be deemed necessary while receiving facility resources are stabilized.

S. Preservation of Crime Scene

If the event is determined to be a possible terrorist act, evidence collection will be essential. The KCPD will secure the crime scene and notify the FBI.

## ATTACHMENT N-2

### NATIONAL TERRORISM ADVISORY SYSTEM

#### **The National Terrorism Advisory System**

The National Terrorism Advisory System, or NTAS, replaces the color-coded Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS). This new system will more effectively communicate information about terrorist threats by providing timely, detailed information to the public, government agencies, first responders, airports and other transportation hubs, and the private sector.

It recognizes that Americans all share responsibility for the nation's security, and should always be aware of the heightened risk of terrorist attack in the United States and what they should do.

#### **NTAS Alerts**

After reviewing the available information, the Secretary of Homeland Security will decide, in coordination with other Federal entities, whether an NTAS Alert should be issued. NTAS Alerts will only be issued when credible information is available.

These alerts will include a clear statement that there is an **imminent threat** or **elevated threat**. Using available information, the alerts will provide a concise summary of the potential threat, information about actions being taken to ensure public safety, and recommended steps that individuals, communities, businesses and governments can take to help prevent, mitigate or respond to the threat.

The NTAS Alerts will be based on the nature of the threat: in some cases, alerts will be sent directly to law enforcement or affected areas of the private sector, while in others, alerts will be issued more broadly to the American people through both official and media channels.

NTAS Alerts contain a **sunset** provision indicating a specific date when the alert expires - there will not be a constant NTAS Alert or blanket warning that there is an overarching threat. If threat information changes for an alert, the Secretary of Homeland Security may announce an updated NTAS Alert. All changes, including the announcement that cancels an NTAS Alert, will be distributed the same way as the original alert.